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RECONCEPTUALIZING JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AS
JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILITY: A Tale of Two
Justice Kennedys
Eric J. Segallt
INTRODUCTION
Most academics and politicians who accuse the Supreme Court of
judicial activism focus on specific results to support their arguments.
Conservatives rail against Court decisions protecting privacy and other non-
economic individual rights,' whereas liberals criticize the Court's
federalism, pro-business, and affirmative action decisions.2 Meanwhile,
although a few law professors and political scientists have taken more
nuanced multi-factor and empirical approaches to measure judicial activism,
they also adopt as a central focus of their arguments attention to specific
decisions by the Supreme Court.' Because these attempts to use the term
judicial activism as a measure of something important (and usually
i Professor of Law, Georgia State College of Law. I would like to thank Michael Dorf,
Michael Gerhardt, Lori Ringhand, Mark Tushnet, and Patrick Wiseman for helpful comments
on earlier drafts of this article, and Robert Ashe for invaluable research assistance. I feel
obligated to note that several readers of this piece suggested that the title, which refers to "Two
Justice Kennedys," is grammatically incorrect insofar as it should read "Two Justices
Kennedy." The decision to not make that change was mine and mine alone.
1. See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, The Rhetoric of Judicial Critique: From Judicial
Restraint to the Virtual Bill of Rights, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 585, 620-28 (2002)
(canvassing the right wing's critique of the Warren and Burger Court decisions and suggesting
that Ronald Reagan made the issue of judicial activism part of his political campaign against the
left); Jeffrey Toobin, Swing Shift, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 12, 2005 (quoting James Dobson,
director of the group Focus on the Family, as saying that Justice Kennedy was "the most
dangerous man in America" because of his decisions on gay rights and abortion).
2. See Adam Cohen, Last Term's Winner at the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism, N.Y.
TIMES, July 9, 2007, at A16 (describing the conservative victories during the 2006-07 Term as
"judicial activism" and motivated by a "conservative ideology").
3. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, Conservatives and the Seven Sins ofJudicial Activism,
73 U. COLO. L. REv. 1217, 1219-55 (2002) (setting forth seven kinds of activist behavior); Lori
A. Ringhand, Judicial Activism: An Empirical Examination of Voting Behavior on the
Rehnquist Natural Court, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 43, 43-67 (2007) (employing an empirical
analysis of voting behavior to determine activist Justices); Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism
and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REv. 1139, 1144-61 (2002) (setting forth six broad
categories of judicial behavior that could be characterized as activist).
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negative) have generally failed to advance the debate over the proper role of
the Court, some academics and judges have suggested that we abandon the
phrase judicial activism altogether.'
The essential problem with this debate has been the shared assumption
among liberals and conservatives that judicial activism can be measured in
some meaningful way by examining how often the Court invalidates state
and federal legislation; how frequently the Court overturns its own
precedent; and under what circumstances the Court reverses the decisions of
other political actors such as the President or administrative agencies. When
scholars and politicians simply equate judicial activism with judicial
invalidation of the works of the political branches or the reversal of
precedent, however, these commentators do not reveal anything different
than would a pure descriptive account of the Court's decision and rationale.
In our post-realist legal environment, scholars and politicians should
recognize how much discretion the Supreme Court possesses in
constitutional law cases. The decisions reached by the Court cannot be right
or wrong in any objective sense, nor can they be activist or not in any
substantive sense of that term because there is no shared baseline to decide
whether the Supreme Court should interfere with the work of the elected
branches or under what circumstances it should reverse its own decisions.'
As Judge Richard Posner has said so eloquently:
When one uses terms like "'correct" and "incorrect" [to
describe Supreme Court constitutional decisions], all one can
actually mean is that one likes (approves of, agrees with, or is
comfortable with) the decision in question or dislikes (disapproves
of, disagrees with, or is uncomfortable with) it. One may be able
to give reasons for liking or disliking the decision . . . and people
who agree with the reasons will be inclined to say that the decision
is correct or incorrect. But that is just a form of words. One can,
for that matter . . . give reasons for preferring a Margarita to a
Cosmopolitan. The problem, in both cases, is that there are certain
to be equally articulate, "reasonable" people who disagree and can
offer plausible reasons for their disagreement, and there will be no
common metric that will enable a disinterested observer (if there is
4. See Randy E. Barnett, Is the Rehnquist Court an "Activist" Court: The Commerce
Clause Cases, 73 U. COLO. L. REv. 1275, 1275-81 (2002) (arguing that the phrase "judicial
activism" is empty and unhelpful); see also Caprice Roberts, In Search of Judicial Activism:
Dangers in Quantifying the Qualitative, 74 TENN. L. REv. 567, 571, 576 (2007) (citing Frank H.
Easterbrook, Do Liberals and Conservatives Difer in Judicial Activism?, 73 U. COLO. L. REv.
1403, 1409-10 (2002)).
5. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 112-13
(Hill and Wang 1998).
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such a person) to decide who is right. The most striking
characteristic of constitutional debate in the courts, the classroom,
and the media-and a sure sign that such debate eludes objective
resolution-is its interminability. Everything is always up for
grabs intellectually, though not politically.6
Assuming, as most everyone correctly does, that our constitutionally
based representative democracy requires the Court to invalidate
unconstitutional laws in some circumstances and to reverse precedent at
least under some conditions, the Court's erroneous decision to refrain from
overturning the decisions of other political actors or reversing its own cases
may be just as activist as overturning those laws or cases that are not
unconstitutional. By appealing to allegedly incorrect outcomes (results with
which they disagree) to define judicial activism, scholars and politicians
cannot move beyond raw political value judgments.
This problem with the judicial activism debate was recognized in what
one scholar argues is the first article to use that phrase back in 1947. In this
article, Arthur Schlesinger characterized Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy,
and Rutledge as "Judicial Activists," and located their jurisprudential
preferences in the Yale Law School taught belief that "[t]he resources of
legal artifice, the ambiguity of precedents, the range of applicable doctrine,
are all so extensive that in most cases in which there is a reasonable
difference of opinion a judge can come out on either side without straining
the fabric of legal logic." 9 Because of this indeterminacy, one person's
judicial activism is another's appropriate exercise of judicial power, and
there exists no metric for privileging a right answer to that debate. This
baseline problem suggests that we need to change the terms of the
conversation to be consistent with a realistic view of how the Supreme
Court operates in constitutional cases, and that is the primary goal of this
article.
Instead of the current and relentless discussion of judicial activism, I
suggest that we should focus more on what I will call judicial responsibility.
The Court ought to write its decisions consistently with professional
standards, adhere to basic rule of law principles, and, perhaps, engage in
principled decision making while reaching results the public can at least
6. Richard A. Posner, Forward: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REv. 32, 40-41 (2005).
7. See Kennan D. Kmiec, The Origins and Current Meanings of "Judicial Activism," 92
CAL. L. REV. 1441, 1463-71 (2004).
8. Id at 1446 (citing Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Supreme Court: 1947, FORTUNE,
Jan. 1947, at 202, 208).
9. Id. at 1447 (citing Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Supreme Court: 1947, FORTUNE,
Jan. 1947, at 201).
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tolerate.' The latter two values are at stake in the judicial activism debate,
but so far scholars have failed to reach a consensus as to how to analyze
them properly." The obligation that the Court adhere to professional
judicial standards and basic, minimal rule of law principles, on the other
hand, has been largely ignored by scholars and the media because of their
obsession with results. This article suggests that we should begin debating
whether the Court, in constitutional cases, does in fact satisfy these
standards. In other words, instead of constantly focusing on whether the
Court has reached the right results, we should begin asking whether the
Court is properly acting as a court consistent with our judicial traditions.
Unlike the debate over judicial activism, there are commonly agreed
upon baselines among scholars and politicians concerning how the Supreme
Court should decide cases and write opinions in order to meet its obligation
to exercise proper judicial responsibility. To take just a few obvious
examples, Supreme Court Justices should not take bribes or decide cases
based on partisan politics or on whether they have a personal relationship
with the lawyers who argue the cases in front of them. Of course, with the
exception of one exceptional historical event, no one seriously suggests that
the Court acts in those ways.' 2 But there are other core principles that the
Court should follow but often does not. It should not blatantly
mischaracterize or ignore prior relevant decisions, distort the factual record
in the case before it, or make false statements about the past. When the
Court misleads in these ways, its opinions lack transparency, an important
rule of law value. Unfortunately, the Court does engage in this behavior
more frequently than current scholarship suggests, and when it does, the
Court can rightfully be accused of violating fundamental rules of proper
judicial behavior and failing to exercise proper judicial responsibility.
Although there will be some disagreement over when the Court violates
these principles, there are, sadly, many examples where, when the Court's
failings are brought to light, there will be a scholarly consensus that the
Court has fabricated or wrongfully ignored the past." This transparency
problem has been largely overlooked by scholars and politicians because of
the battles over correct results, but this is where the judicial
activism/judicial responsibility debate should begin again, and it can
fruitfully start with the often perplexing but critically important
jurisprudence of Justice Anthony Kennedy.
10. See id. at 1445-49.
11. See infra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
12. Some scholars suggest that Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), was decided in a
partisan manner. See Marshall, supra note 3, at 1245-47.
13. See infra notes 106, 107, 138 and accompanying text for examples.
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Perhaps no Supreme Court Justice in recent history has engendered more
controversy in both the popular media and academic circles than Justice
Kennedy. The right views him as a traitor and judicial activist who makes
but does not interpret the law,14 whereas the left, though pleased with many
of his decisions in the individual rights arena, is suspicious that he will turn
more conservative on abortion, and, in any event, dislikes his views on
affirmative action and federalism." The conventional wisdom is that Justice
Kennedy has adopted a judicial activist stance on issues of personal privacy,
executive power, the death penalty, and federalism, but no one can
persuasively make that case because, for reasons I will discuss in part I, to
the extent that the charge of judicial activism suggests the Court is
overstepping its proper boundaries in selecting results, there is no way to
measure such a phenomenon in light of the open spaces the Court is
required to fill. On the other hand, to the extent that proper judicial
responsibility requires judges to transparently justify their decisions and not
fabricate the past, these factors have been overlooked by scholars and the
media in their evaluations of Justice Kennedy. Because Justice Kennedy's
decisions reflect both extremes of the judicial responsibility scale, his
jurisprudence provides an excellent vehicle for reconceptualizing the debate
over the proper role of the Supreme Court and can provide valuable
information to politicians, academics, and the public at large.16
Part I explains why the political and academic debate over judicial
activism has failed to promote a more meaningful understanding of the
14. See Matthew Continetti, An Indecent Decision: Justice Kennedy's Atrocious Child
Rape Ruling, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, July 7, 2008, available at
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/015/269gzinz.asp?pg-2
(asking from a conservative perspective, "What are the scariest words in constitutional law
these days?" and answering "Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court."); see also
Dana Milbank, And the Verdict on Justice Kennedy Is: Guilty, WASH. PosT, Apr. 9, 2005, at
A03 (describing animus directed at Justice Kennedy by conservative leaders).
15. See David Cole, The 'Kennedy Court', THE NATION, July 14, 2006, available at
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060731/cole (noting Justice Kennedy's prior "conservative"
rulings on abortion and affirmative action, and predicting that liberals and progressives would
lament upcoming rulings by Justice Kennedy on those topics).
16. As Kermit Roosevelt has elegantly said, "the Constitution does not belong to judges . .
and it does not belong to political activists, as a set of incendiary talking points. It belongs to
the people. It is our responsibility to judge the Court, and it is our judgment that must be
decisive in the end." KERMIT ROOSEVELT, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 7 (Yale Univ. Press
2006). Although some may argue that "the people" will not be able to judge when Supreme
Court Justices transgress core transparency principles given the thickness of legal doctrine,
constitutional law scholars can certainly help both the public and the media understand this
problem. In any event, it is not clear how much the public understands the reality of the debate
over the results reached by the Supreme Court.
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Supreme Court. Part II sets forth a new paradigm of judicial responsibility
to evaluate the work of the Court and when it exceeds its appropriate
boundaries. Part III applies this analysis to the jurisprudence of Justice
Anthony Kennedy, currently the swing vote on the Court and the most
"powerful judge in America."17 By applying this new view of judicial
responsibility to the opinions of one particular Justice, I hope to begin a
fresh debate over the Court as a whole.
I. THE DEBATE OVER JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
A. The Politicians
Although the debate over judicial activism among politicians is older
than the Constitution," the racial desegregation decisions of the Warren
Court combined with the rise of the modem media generated a particularly
strong public critique of the Supreme Court by conservatives of both parties
during the 1950's and 1960's." For example, Senator James Eastland of
Mississippi said after Brown v. Board Education was decided, "[We] will
not abide by nor obey this legislative decision by a political court."20 In
1958, a number of state chief justices published a report criticizing the
Warren Court's activism, and a few years later the Council on State
Governments supported constitutional amendments that would allow state
legislatures to amend the Constitution without federal interference and
create a special tribunal composed of the chief justices of all fifty states that
would be empowered to overrule the Supreme Court in cases involving
state/federal power.2' The Warren Court's later decisions on prayer in
school,22 one person/one vote,23 and criminal procedure, 24 among many
17. See RicHARD POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 311 (Harvard Univ. Press 2007).
18. See Erica Weisberger, Unpublished Opinions: A Convenient Means to an
Unconstitutional Ends, 97 GEO. L.J. 621, 634 n. 59 (2009) ("The interpretation of the laws is the
proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by
the judges as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as
the meaning of any particular proceeding from the legislative body.") (citing THE FEDERALIST
No. 78, at 427 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 2002)).
19. Previous accusations of judicial overreaching were usually made by the political left in
response to the Court's protection of economic liberties in the early twentieth century. See infra
notes 32-34, and accompanying text.
20. Gerhardt, supra note 1, at 620 (citation omitted).
21. Id. at 623.
22. Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424-25 (1962) (prohibiting prayers in public schools).
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others, inflamed conservatives and led to repeated calls for an overhauling
of the Supreme Court.25 By the end of the 1960's, the political right's revolt
against the Court culminated in Richard Nixon's successful campaign
against the Warren Court and its liberal decisions.26
As a candidate, President Nixon used rhetoric that conservatives
continue to use to describe the kind of Justices they believe should sit on the
Court. President Nixon promised to appoint, "strict constructionists" who
would see "their duty as interpreting law and not making law." 27 Later,
Ronald Reagan repeatedly said that "the job of judges is to interpret the law
of the Constitution, not make it."28 Recently, while running for President,
Rudolph Giuliani said that "We have to appoint strict constructionist judges
because judges interpret the constitution. They should not be allowed to
make it up . . . . They [should] not get it into their heads that they're really
legislators and that they can go around changing things." 29 And, former
President George W. Bush said that Supreme Court Justices should be
"strict constructionists who . . . hew closely to the law rather than judicial
activists . . . ."3 This political anthem, that Supreme Court Justices should
"interpret" but not "make" the law, has become a standard refrain of the
political right's vocabulary and its attack on the Democratic Party."
23. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 207-08 (1962) (holding that the proper apportionment of
state legislatures is not a political question paving the way for the Court to require a one
person/one vote system).
24. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (requiring the giving of certain
warnings to all criminal defendants).
25. Conservatives in the Warren Court era "called for 'judicial restraint' or 'strict
constructionism' in place of liberal judicial activism, contending that 'when liberal Courts
overturn democratically enacted laws in favor of liberal, activist constititutionalism, they
destroy citizens' rights to a democratic participation and self government." Frank Cross &
Stephanie Lindquist, The Scientific Study of Judicial Activism, 91 MINN. L. Rev. 1752, 1756
(2007) (citations omitted).
26. See Gerhardt, supra note 1, at 623-25.
27. Id. at 625 (citation omitted).
28. Matthew J. Franck, Originalist Thinking, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, June 9, 2004,
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=NmYwMzkxYzRjN2VIODdhM2Y3YniMyMjQzMDIkM
DkwNDk=-
29. Chris Welch, Giuliani Vows to Appoint 'Strict Constructionist' Judges, CNN
POLITICAL TICKER, July 18, 2007, http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2007/07/18/giuliani-
vows-to-appoint-strict-constructionist-judges/.
30. Kmiec, supra note 7, at 1471 (citation omitted).
31. See, e.g., Continetti, supra note 14 (noting the "political lesson" that "the fight to turn
the Court from a capricious and imperious vanguard of liberalism into an impassive umpire is
far from over," and encouraging the Republican nominee for President, Senator John McCain,
to explain his judicial philosophy).
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Long before Presidents Nixon, Reagan, and Bush railed against liberal
Justices, however, left wing politicians accused the Supreme Court of the
same kind of judicial activism that the right allegedly abhors. Progressives
in the early 1900's and New Dealers in the 1930's repeatedly criticized the
Court for exceeding constitutional boundaries by invalidating state and
federal economic legislation.32 In fact, the Socialist Party included in its
1912 platform a plea for "[tihe abolition of the power usurped by the
Supreme Court of the United States to pass upon the constitutionality of the
legislation enacted by Congress. [The platform said that] [n]ational laws
[should] be repealed only by an act of Congress or by a referendum vote of
the whole people."3 3 In 1922, in a letter to Justice John H. Clarke, Woodrow
Wilson was concerned with the "immediate danger" that "courts will more
and more outrage the people's sense of justice and cause a revulsion against
judicial authority . . . and I can see nothing which can save us from this
danger if the Supreme Court is to repudiate liberal courses of thought and
action."34
Of course, the Court eventually approved rather than repudiated the New
Deal "liberal courses of thought and action." After President Roosevelt
changed the personnel on the Court, and the new Justices changed their
focus from economic to personal liberty, charges of judicial activism
became the standard critique of the right. It was not until the late 1980's and
1990's, when the Rehnquist Court began issuing pro-state power federalism
opinions,35 overturning affirmative action programs, 36 and reversing many
liberal precedents on criminal procedure,37 that liberals again argued that the
Court was engaging in far reaching judicial activism."
This summary demonstrates that both liberal and conservative politicians
throw out accusations of judicial activism whenever the Court decides cases
with which they disagree. Despite this long history, however, perhaps the
one decision that escalated the controversy over judicial activism more than
32. See Roosevelt, supra note 16, at 14.
33. See Gerhardt, supra note 1, at 592 (citation omitted).
34. Id. at 603 (citation omitted).
35. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (reversing recent
precedent and holding that Congress cannot abrogate states' sovereign immunity under the
Commerce Clause.).
36. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (applying strict
scrutiny to federal government's affirmative action program).
37. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (reversing decision outlawing
victim impact statements in capital cases).
38. See THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE ROAD
TO MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM (Univ. of Chicago Press 2004); THE REHNQUIST COURT:
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON THE RIGHT (Herman Schwartz ed., Hill & Wang 2002).
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any other was the Burger Court's decision in Roe v. Wade.39 When former
Presidents Reagan and Bush argued that the Supreme Court should interpret
not make the law, in large part they were appealing to pro-life
fundamentalists. This distinction between interpreting and making the law
is now, sadly, part of our national vocabulary and often employed in the
judicial activism debate by right-wing politicians.40 In fact, the right
conflates these terms to suggest that when Justices engage in judicial
activism or judicial legislation it is because they are making not interpreting
the law. This misleading rhetoric has infected recent Supreme Court
nomination hearings to a considerable and unfortunate degree.41
This alleged distinction between Justices making and interpreting the
law, however, does not meaningfully advance the debate over judicial
review and should be discarded. For example, to the extent that the modem
political right believes that Justices Scalia and Thomas are less likely to
make than interpret the law than Justices such as Souter and Stevens, the
argument is not persuasive. If judicial activism is defined as the Court
overturning the acts of the elected branches and the States, as well as
reversing its own precedent, then Justices Scalia and Thomas are just as
activist as their more liberal colleagues.42 The Court's recent Tenth
Amendment, Eleventh Amendment, and affirmative action decisions
involved the Court overturning acts of Congress, the States, and its own
prior cases without much concern about judicial activism.43 As Professor
Ringhand has argued, there is simply no empirical basis to argue that certain
Justices on the Court make, rather than interpret the law more than other
Justices on the Court.44 Therefore, it is not surprising that this political
39. Roe v Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
40. See, e.g., Continetti, supra note 14; see also Klaus Marre, McCain Lambastes Judicial
Activism, THE HILL.COM, May 6, 2008, http://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/1322-mccain-
lambastes-judicial-activism; Herman Schwartz, One Man's Activist: What Republicans Really
Mean When They Condemn Judicial Activism GOP Lawmakers, Bob Barr, Orrin G. Hatch,
and Majority Whip Tom DeLay Attack Judicial Activism, WASH. MONTHLY, Nov. 1997,
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi ml316/is ni1 v29/ai20017393/print?tag=artBody;coll.
41. See Roosevelt, supra note 16, at 1-3.
42. See Ringhand, supra note 3, at 45-46.
43. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007)
(overturning affirmative action plans by local school districts under Equal Protection Clause);
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (overturning federal gun control law on federalism
grounds); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (overturning federal gaming
law on federalism grounds).
44. See Ringhand, supra note 3, at 45 ("conservative justices as well as their more liberal
counterparts actively 'replace' legislative choices with their own preferred outcomes, and they
do so at a roughly equal pace, although . .. in different types of cases.").
71741:0709]
ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [
debate about judicial activism is more about rhetoric and partisan advantage
than anything that makes a substantive difference.
More importantly, there is no merit to the charge that even in those cases
where the Court overturns political decisions, the Supreme Court makes and
does not interpret the law. As I will argue in more detail in the next section,
the implication by politicians on both sides of the aisle is that when the
Court incorrectly overturns the actions of the elected branches, it is
somehow making law. But this conclusion rests on several erroneous
assumptions. First, in most constitutional cases decided by the Supreme
Court, the "law" as defined to mean text, precedent, history, tradition, and
structure, either runs out or is ambiguous, leaving a large hole in the
doctrine under consideration.45 Therefore, although one can agree or
disagree with a Court decision for valid reasons, reasonable people also can
disagree about what should be the correct result. As Judge Posner has
pointed out, for example, change a Justice here or there, put Judge Bork in
Justice Kennedy's place, or simply leave Earl Warren off the Court for a
few more years, and many landmark decisions such as Brown v. Board of
Education,46 Texas v. Johnson,4 and U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,4
might have been decided differently. Yet, to suggest that the Court was
making law in all of those cases rather than interpreting the law begs the
very questions that make those cases difficult. A judicial philosophy that
leads to the conclusion that the Constitution bars affirmative action,
prohibitions on abortion, or term limits for members of Congress no more
makes law than the opposite philosophies because there is no clear answer
to those questions based on the traditional sources of constitutional
interpretation. Rather, one's conclusions about these questions are much
more a matter of values than logic. 49
We would have an improved political debate over Supreme Court
nominees and the resulting performance of the Court if politicians stopped
treating constitutional issues as if they implicated some objectively right or
wrong view of the Court's institutional role and instead argued about these
questions directly. Whether term limits are constitutional or seventeen year-
olds can constitutionally be executed for capital crimes are the kinds of
difficult political and policy questions the Supreme Court must decide
without significant help or constraint from pre-existing positive law
sources. Perhaps if politicians debated the questions directly, the judicial
45. See Posner, supra note 6; see also infra note 75 and accompanying text.
46. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
47. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
48. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
49. See Posner, supra note 6.
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activism merry-go-around might spin a little slower and a little less often.
Perhaps if we change the terms of the debate, we might even be spared the
insult and indignity of listening to the President of the United States and
those running for that Office employ the useless rhetoric that we need
Justices "who will interpret and not make the law."so
B. The Academic Debate Over Judicial Activism
Most constitutional scholars share two basic premises about the judicial
activism debate. First, they argue that we need a more precise definition of
what we mean by judicial activism because all too often it simply means "a
decision one does not like."" Academics have suggested that the term is
"elusive,"5 2 "readily manipulable,"53 and "slippery."54 These descriptions
understate how difficult it has been for commentators to agree on what
exactly constitutes judicial activism. As Professor Gerhardt stated in his
brilliant article detailing the history of scholarly and political critique of the
Supreme Court, "the same themes-abuse of power, judicial usurpation and
restraint, and unprincipled activism-have been sounded throughout the
past century . . . ."s It appears that one principle everyone can agree on is
that we need a more coherent and transparent definition of judicial activism
in order to successfully carry on the debate over the appropriate role of the
Supreme Court.
Because of this lack of consensus among scholars as to what constitutes
judicial activism, there has been a spate of recent articles employing
complicated and multi-faceted approaches to defining the phrase. Although
the tests vary in style and substance, one common theme is the importance
of examining the results reached by the Supreme Court. For example,
William Marshall has suggested that a helpful definition of judicial activism
should include the following factors:
(1) Counter-Majoritarian Activism: the reluctance of the courts to
defer to the decisions of the democratically elected branches;
(2) Non-Originalist Activism: the failure of the courts to defer to
some notion of originalism in deciding cases, whether that
50. See Roosevelt, supra note 16, at 1-3.
51. Marshall, supra note 3, at 1217.
52. Roberts, supra note 4, at 570.
53. Young, supra note 3, at 1141.
54. Kmiec, supra note 7, at 1442.
55. Gerhardt, supra note 1, at 638.
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originalism is grounded in a strict fealty to text or in reference to
the original intent of the framers;
(3) Precedential Activism: the failure of the courts to defer to
judicial precedent;
(4) Jurisdictional Activism: the failure of the courts to adhere to
jurisdictional limits on their own power;
(5) Judicial Creativity: the creation of new theories and rights in
constitutional doctrine;
(6) Remedial Activism: the use of judicial power to impose
ongoing affirmative obligations on the other branches of
government or to take governmental institutions under ongoing
judicial supervision as a part of a judicially imposed remedy; and
(7) Partisan Activism: the use of judicial power to accomplish
plainly partisan objectives.56
Professor Marshall does not intend for these factors to supply a
normative judgment about the workings of the Court but instead as a
general measurement of the "court's activism." 5 7 After applying these
various factors (all of which have to do with looking at results) to the
workings of the Supreme Court, Professor Marshall reaches the conclusion
that both conservative and liberal Justices engage in judicial activism, and
neither's record "fairly appraised" can "be characterized as excessive,"
compared to the judicial activism of the other side. In other words, his
discussion of judicial activism and the application of his seven factors leads
to no firm conclusions about the workings of the Court, other than it
frequently exercises its power to engage in judicial activism.
In another detailed, scholarly account of judicial activism, Ernest Young
attempted to come up with a definition of the phrase that would focus
"attention on the judiciary's institutional role rather than the merits of
particular decisions."" In focusing on the Court's role rather than on
particular decisions, Professor Young argued that words like "activist" and
56. Marshall, supra note 3, at 1220.
57. Id. at 1221.
58. Id. at 1255. In fairness to Professor Marshall, the major thesis in his article is not that
conservatives are more activist than liberals, or visa-versa, but rather that conservative
politicians are hypocritical when they suggest that conservative Justices engage in less judicial
activism than liberal or moderate Justices. He is no doubt correct on this point.
59. Young, supra note 3, at 1141.
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"restrained," will be more useful to describe specific aspects of decisions
rather than evaluating the "overall record of the Supreme Court over a
particular period of time."60 Although this insight is no doubt correct in that
within the same decision, or line of decisions, the Court can be both activist
and deferential at the same time, it also underscores the failings of a result-
centered definition of judicial activism. Here are Professor Young's "many
faces" of activism, which sound similar to the list compiled by Professor
Marshall: "(1) second-guessing the federal political branches or state
governments; (2) departing from text and/or history; (3) departing from
judicial precedent; (4) issuing broad or "maximalist" holdings rather than
narrow or "minimalist" ones; (5) exercising broad remedial powers; and (6)
decidin cases according to the partisan political preferences of the
judges.
As these factors demonstrate, Professor Young also argues that judicial
activism is in some way linked to the degree to which the Court interferes
with the other branches of government. Young makes this clear by arguing
that the above-listed behaviors are "linked by a common thread: they all
involve a refusal by the Court deciding a particular case to defer to other
sorts of authority at the expense of its independent judgment about the
correct legal outcome." 62 This linkage between judicial activism and the
frequency with which the Court defers or does not defer to the other
branches of government, the states, and its own prior decisions is the second
shared assumption among academics writing about judicial activism, and
nowhere is this phenomenon more pronounced than among those scholars
engaging in an empirical analysis of the Supreme Court. In a recent article,
Professor Ringhand purported to measure judicial activism by employing a
statistical approach to the Rehnquist Court era. She clearly stated the goals
of her article:
This paper attempts to quantify one of the most deeply
contested terms in constitutional law: "judicial activism." Most
discussions of "judicial activism" define activism either in
reference to a particular political ideology (such as complaints
about "liberal activist judges") or a particular method of
constitutional interpretation (such as assertions that a decision was
"activist" because it was not based on the original meaning of the
Constitution). This paper sidesteps those debates, focusing instead
on an empirical examination of how recent U.S. Supreme Court
justices have in fact exercised their judicial power. I do this by
60. Id. at 1143.
61. Id. at 1144.
62. Id. at 1145.
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examining the voting records of the individual justices in three
areas: how often did the justices vote to invalidate federal
legislation, how often did they do so in relation to state legislation,
and how often did they vote to overturn existing judicial
precedents? I also examine the issue areas in which each of the
justices cast these votes and the ideological direction of the
votes.63
After engaging in this empirical analysis, Professor Ringhand concluded,
like Professor Marshall and most other academics, that "conservative
justices as well as their more liberal counterparts actively 'replace'
legislative choices with their own preferred outcomes, and they do so at a
roughly equal pace, although . . . in different types of cases."6 4 In fact, most
recent academic scholarship seems to be devoted to proving that the
conservative wing of the Court is just as activist as the liberal/moderate
wing, and academics employing both empirical analysis as well as detailed
doctrinal review inevitably reach that conclusion.
Although Professor Ringhand's conclusion about liberals and
conservatives is undoubtedly correct, it adds little to the judicial activism
debate because it equates the overturning of the decisions of the elected
branches and the reversal of Court precedent with judicial activism. But
unless that phrase is drained of all substantive and normative content, there
is no way to determine whether a Court decision to invalidate another
political actor's preference is activist because there is no commonly agreed
upon baseline to support such a conclusion. For example, many
conservatives viewed the Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas66 as a
classic example of judicial activism. According to the critics, Justice
Kennedy's opinion not only reversed the fairly recent landmark case of
Bowers v. Hardwick,6 but it also invalidated Texas's prohibition on same
sex sexual conduct without any clear basis in text, history, structure or
precedent.6 8 On the other hand, to the extent that the liberty provision of the
14 th Amendment protects fundamental, private decisions about procreation,
intimacy, and bodily functions, a proposition for which there is both textual
63. Ringhand, supra note 3, at 43-44 (footnotes omitted). For another empirical analysis
of the Court's decisions in the context of the judicial activism debate, see Cross & Lindquist,
supra note 25.
64. Ringhand, supra note 3, at 45.
65. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 3, at 1255; Ringhand, supra note 3, at 45; Cross &
Linquist, supra note 25, at 1753.
66. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
67. See id.
68. See id at 587, 594-95, 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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and precedential support,69 the Court would have been remiss in its role, or
to put it another way, would have acted outside its institutional boundaries,
to allow Texas to put people in jail for conduct protected by the
Constitution. Whether invalidating the Texas statute was more activist than
allowing it to stand is a question which simply does not yield a right or
wrong answer. Yet, Professor Ringhand, as well as the other academics
involved in this debate, would clearly define Lawrence as an activist
decision.70
Another example from the other side of the political spectrum is the
Court's decision in United States v. Lopez.n Liberals castigated the Court
for refusing to allow Congress to outlaw guns around schools and suggested
that the decision was judicially activist.72 If we use the definitions of
judicial activism suggested by Professors Marshall, Young, and Ringhand,
that description is obviously accurate. The Court invalidated an Act of
Congress while at the same time casting great doubt on much of its own
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. However, to the extent that the Court is
supposed to police the appropriate boundaries between state and federal
power, and to the extent that the Gun Free School Zones Act transcended
that line because of its tenuous relationship to the national economy, the
Court's duty was to invalidate the law. Again, there is no method of
resolving the debate over whether the Court acted correctly. All we can say
is that the Court did overturn an act of Congress, and if that means the same
thing as saying it engaged in judicial activism, then we are not saying very
much at all but just describing what the Court did.
It turns out that the Supreme Court, whether in liberal, conservative or
moderate times, has throughout history invalidated the acts of other political
actors and reversed its own precedent, and any definition of judicial
activism that is based on an examination of how often, or in what cases, the
Court overturns legislation and prior decisions will in the end duplicate
substantive critique of the Court's legal doctrine. That is why both
academic and political claims that the Court has exceeded its institutional
role have been constant throughout American history. Professor Gerhardt
69. See Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas,
2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21 (2003).
70. See Ringhand, supra note 3, at App. B.
71. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995).
72. Justice Souter's dissent makes this argument. See id. at 604, 611 (Souter, J.,
dissenting); see also Michael C. Dorf, They Are All Activists Now, FINDLAW.COM, May 1, 2000,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20000501.html; Donald H. Zeigler, The New Activist Court,
45 AM. U. L. REV. 1369, 1389-1401 (1996).
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has ably summarized the history of the accusations of judicial activism by
politicians and academics across the political spectrum:
In Thayer's classic plea of 1893 for judicial self-restraint; in
President Roosevelt's impassioned radio "chat" of March 9, 1937,
calling for re-organization of the federal judiciary; in the
unsuccessful crusade in 1957 to curb judicial enforcement of
certain provisions of the Bill of Rights; in Senator Everet
Dirksen's repeated attempts to undo by constitutional amendment
the 1964 "one man, one-vote" ruling on state legislative
apportionment; and underlying the proposed constitutional
amendments to outlaw busing, overturn Roe, authorize states to
outlaw flag-burning, eliminate life tenure for federal judges, and
make Supreme Court decisions overturning state and federal laws
subject to a congressional veto. Judicial restraint is no more the
singular province of conservatives than activism is the penchant of
only liberals.73
If the judicial activism debate is to mean something different than a
substantive disagreement with Court decisions, we must move in a new
direction. We must try to find some generally accepted baseline conduct,
other than the review of specific outcomes, against which we can measure
the Court and its opinions. The next section of this article suggests such a
framework.
II. THE PARADIGM OF JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILITY
As I demonstrated in the prior Section, the judicial activism debate is not
furthered by politicians and academics who use the phrase simply as a
measure of how often the Court reverses the decisions of other political
actors. If the measurement is how much or how little deference the Court
gives to other institutions, there is no agreed upon baseline to determine
whether the Court in a particular case, or era, is appropriately activist or not.
However, if we change our perspective to an analysis of how we expect the
Court to write its decisions and justify its outcomes, most scholars and
politicians will agree on certain fundamental principles. Apart from the
obvious rules of judicial ethics, which no scholar has suggested the Court
has violated in any significant way, we should expect the Court to explain
its decisions with a minimum degree of transparency, coherency, and
honesty. These requirements are important because if the Court distorts
verifiable factual or legal events, it undermines the Court's credibility and
73. Gerhardt, supra note 1, at 638.
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possibly suggests that the Court is reaching results for illegitimate reasons.
This in turn makes it difficult to evaluate whether the Court is treating
similarly situated people similarly, a core requirement of the rule of law.7 4
Moreover, when the Court fabricates facts or ignores or distorts material
arguments, it is not acting like a Court-or to put it another way, it is not
adequately exercising judicial responsibility. As H. Jefferson Powell has
recently written:
Because of the inescapability of judgment in the interpretation
and application of the Constitution, candor is essential if the
justices . . . are to ask the rest of us to take them seriously ....
Only if you and I understand the true grounds of the decision can
we assent to its correctness . . . to its validity as the outcome of our
system even though we think it wrong in substance. Because the
Constitution is not a crossword puzzle with only one right answer.
. . playing the constitutional law game fairly demands that the
players be clear about why they give the answers they do. Candor
is indispensable if the system is to retain its moral dignity ....
The constitutional virtue of candor, therefore, goes beyond
honesty . . . . It is the disposition to seek . .. a congruity between
the mind grappling with the constitutional issue before it and the
language in which that struggle and its resolution is expressed ...
75
The most serious objection to this framework may be that there will be
no agreement on when the Court fails to act in a minimally transparent
manner or when it fabricates or distorts historical facts. In response to these
possible objections, I will give examples of Court opinions that by any
reasonable standard contain these failings. After providing these examples, I
will try to show why such decision-making is harmful, and demonstrate,
through the jurisprudence of Justice Kennedy, the value of asking these
kinds of questions.
The most common way the Court distorts the past is to mischaracterize,
beyond any reasonable doubt, a prior case. A classic example of this type of
phenomenon is Justice Black's majority opinion in Younger v. Harris.76 The
issue in the case was whether the plaintiff could seek an injunction in
federal court against a state court prosecution for distributing anti-
74. See William B. Barker, The Three Faces of Equality: Constitutional Requirements in
Taxation, 57 CASEW. RES. L. REv. 1, 35 (2006).
75. H. JEFFERSON POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE 90 (Univ. of Chicago Press
2008).
76. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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government leaflets.77 For most of our history, the Supreme Court has not
allowed federal court injunctions against state court prosecutions absent a
showing of bad faith, which was not at issue in Younger. In 1965, however,
a majority of the Court in Dombrowski v. Pfister 8 plainly held that the bar
against state court injunctions would be lowered if the plaintiff alleged that
the statute he was being prosecuted under was facially overbroad under the
First Amendment. This part of the opinion was not dicta79 and led to
numerous post-Dombrowski attempts to enjoin local prosecutions of civil
rights activities under statutes challenged as being overbroad under the First
Amendment."
By the time the Court heard Younger, the Court was obviously concerned
with how intrusive these federal lawsuits were on state law enforcement.8
The Court held in Younger that allegations by a plaintiff that a statute was
overbroad under the First Amendment did not constitute an exception to the
rule that federal courts should not enjoin state court criminal prosecutions.82
To reach that decision the Court had to wrestle with the opposite holding in
Dombrowski. The Court could have simply reversed the decision but
declined to do so. The Court said the following:
The District Court . . . thought that the Dombrowski decision
substantially broadened the availability of injunctions against state
criminal prosecutions and that under that decision the federal
courts may give equitable relief, without regard to any showing of
bad faith or harassment, whenever a state statute is found 'on its
face' to be vague or overly broad, in violation of the First
77. Id. at 38-42.
78. 380 U.S. 479, 492 (1965).
79. The Court said: "A criminal prosecution under a statute regulating expression usually
involves imponderables and contingencies that themselves may inhibit the full exercise of First
Amendment freedoms. When the statutes also have an overbroad sweep, as is here alleged, the
hazard of loss or substantial impairment of those precious rights may be critical. For in such
cases, the statutes lend themselves too readily to denial of those rights. The assumption that
defense of a criminal prosecution will generally assure ample vindication of constitutional rights
is unfounded in such cases. . . . Because of the sensitive nature of constitutionally protected
expression, we have not required that all of those subject to overbroad regulations risk
prosecution to test their rights. For free expression - of transcendent value to all society, and not
merely to those exercising their rights - might be the loser." Id. at 486 (citations omitted).
80. See Ada Sheng, Analyzing the International Criminal Court Complementarity
Principle Through a Federal Courts Lens, 13 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 413, 429 (2007);
Michael Wells, Positivism and Antipositivism in Federal Courts Law, 29 GA. L. REv. 655, 689
n. 173 (1995).
81. Younger, 401 U.S. at 42-45.
82. Id. at 52-53.
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Amendment. We recognize that there are some statements in the
Dombrowski opinion that would seem to support this argument.83
The Court then went on to explain why it thought that the part of
Dombrowski relied on by the district court was simply dicta. The Younger
Court said that the injunction was appropriate in Dombrowski because the
plaintiffs had alleged bad faith enforcement of the law,8 4 and therefore the
First Amendment analysis was unnecessary to the holding of the Court."
But this statement is simply and unarguably false. The Court in
Dombrowski remanded the case to the lower court for a factual
determination of the plaintiffs' bad faith allegations but in another part of
the opinion enjoined any prosecution of the plaintiffs under those parts of
the state law that were held facially invalid. The Dombrowski Court held the
following:
The precise terms and scope of the injunctive relief to which
appellants are entitled and the identity of the appellees to be
enjoined cannot, of course, be determined until after the District
Court conducts the hearing on remand [on the bad faith
allegations]. The record suffices, however, to permit this Court to
hold that, without the benefit of limiting construction, the statutory
provisions on which the indictments are founded are void on their
face; [and] until an acceptable limiting construction is obtained,
the provisions cannot be applied to the activities of SCEF,
whatever they may be. 86
Justice Black in Younger misstated the holding, facts, and procedural
posture of the Dombrowski decision perhaps to avoid having to overrule it
expressly. The question arises: So what? The Court could have reached the
same result in many different ways including explicitly reversing
Dombrowski. One answer is that when the Court justifies a decision by
fabricating a description of a prior case directly on point, the Court makes a
mockery of the notion of stare decisis. It is one thing to narrow a prior
decision or extend it or limit it to some rational degree, but it is quite
another to flatly misstate the holding of the prior case. While many may
ignore this failing because it happens so frequently, this apathy to the
Court's continuous irresponsibility is exactly the problem. The Court acts
outside its appropriate role when it dishonestly summarizes past decisions
because judges should not engage in that kind of misleading behavior. It is
83. Id. at 50 (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 48-50.
85. Id. at 50.
86. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 497 (1965).
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inconsistent with the idea that prior law matters. It is not how judges should
behave. It is, quite simply, irresponsible judicial behavior.
An interesting aspect of Younger is that there has been little criticism of
Justice Black's faulty analysis over the years nor accusations of judicial
activism because, as a matter of result, the Court actually deferred to
another political institution-the state court judicial system. The definitions
employed by Professors Marshall, Young, and Ringhold would not count
Younger as an activist case because it did not reverse state or federal
legislation or explicitly its own precedent. The only scholars who might
label Younger activist are those who disagree with the Court's decision."
But other eminent scholars view Younger abstention as correct." That
difficult debate has no clear answer but regardless of who is right or wrong,
we can all agree that Justice Black and the Justices who joined his opinion
acted improperly by mischaracterizing the holding of Dombrowski. On this
point, we can reach consensus without disputed baselines and contestable
value judgments.
During the 1990's, the Court decided two important issues of public
policy that demonstrate the futility of the current debate over judicial
activism but illustrate how a change in that debate may be helpful. These
two issues are (1) the appropriate level of review governing the federal
government's ability to employ racial preferences pursuant to its power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and (2) whether Congress
may commandeer state legislatures and executives to implement federal
law.89 Both questions raise important federalism questions as to the
constitutional powers that Congress may exercise.
The Court first suggested that the federal government may not be limited
in its use of affirmative action in the same way as the states in Fullilove v.
Klutznick,90 which rejected a facial challenge to a minority set aside
requirement in a federal spending program. Although the various opinions
did not agree on what level of review applied to racial preferences created
by Congress, it was clear that at least six Justices did not apply strict
87. See Martin Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Judicial Function, 94
YALE L.J. 71, 86 (1984) (arguing that Court's abstention doctrines violate the separation of
powers).
88. See Barry Freidman, A Revisionist Theory of Abstention, 88 MICH. L. REv. 530, 559
(1988) (arguing that "[y]ounger abstention generally is appropriate in any case in which the
federal defendant already has begun a state proceeding at the time the federal action is
commenced, or begins such a proceeding shortly after the federal action is filed.").
89. See Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1995); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1887).
90. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 449-51 (1980).
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scrutiny to the challenged program. Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion
emphasized "appropriate deference to Congress" and rejected the idea that
Congress has to act in a "color blind" fashion when exercising its powers
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 91
Almost ten years and a number of Court personnel changes later, the
Court revisited the question of minority set asides but this time with regard
to a program enacted by the City of Richmond, Virginia.92 The City's
affirmative action plan had been patterned after the program that was
upheld in Fullilove.9 3 In an opinion written by Justice O'Connor, the Court
distinguished Fullilove on the grounds that the scope of congressional
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to redress racial
problems is greater than the power exercised by the states and its
subdivisions. The Court said the following:
That Congress may identify and redress the effects of society-
wide discrimination does not mean that, a fortiori, the States ...
are free to decide that such remedies are appropriate. Section I of
the Fourteenth Amendment is an explicit constraint on state
power, and the States must undertake any remedial efforts in
accordance with that provision. To hold otherwise would be to
cede control over the content of the Equal Protection Clause to the
50 State legislatures . . . . We believe such a result would be
contrary to the intentions of the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment, who desired to place clear limits on the States' use of
race as a criterion for legislative action . .. 94
After distinguishing Fullilove on the basis that state power to remedy
racial injustices is more limited than Congress', the Court applied strict
scrutiny to Richmond's set aside program and held it unconstitutional under
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Given Justice O'Connor's treatment of the respective powers of the
states and Congress, it was perhaps not surprising that a year later a
majority of the Court in Metro Broadcasting v. FCC,96 flatly and
unequivocally held that intermediate-not strict scrutiny-would be applied
by the Court to racial preferences adopted by Congress and administrative
agencies acting pursuant to Congressional authority. In reviewing the
validity of two minority preference policies adopted by the FCC, the Court
91. Id. at 482.
92. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 476-77 (1989).
93. See id. at 469.
94. Id. at 490-91.
95. Id. at 490, 494, 511.
96. 497 U.S. 547, 564 (1990).
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said that "benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress . . . are
constitutionally permissible to the extent that they serve important
governmental objectives within the power of Congress and are substantially
related to achievement of those objectives."97 The five Justices, specifically
noted that "much of the language and reasoning in Croson reaffirmed the
lesson of Fullilove that race-conscious classifications adopted by Congress .
. . are subject to a different standard than such classifications prescribed by
state and local governments."98 At the time that Metro Broadcasting was
decided, the only Supreme Court cases that discussed the issue of different
levels of review for congressional and state racial preferences were
Fullilove and Croson, and a majority of the Court quite reasonably
interpreted those cases to require intermediate scrutiny for congressionally
mandated affirmative action programs.
The next time the Court reviewed a federal affirmative action program,
Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena,99 the Court changed its mind and held
that strict scrutiny applied to all racial preferences, even those enacted by
Congress.'o That result, according to some scholars on the left, amounts to
judicial activism in light of the history and purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment."o' Others, of course, disagree and believe that the Court
correctly ruled that any racial preferences enacted by any governmental
body should be governed by strict scrutiny.102 This debate is a difficult one,
and reasonable people can disagree over whether the Court was correct. But
what reasonable people cannot disagree about is the failure of Justice
O'Connor's opinion in Adarand to correctly outline the previous history of
this issue. She first claimed that the Court's cases prior to Metro
Broadcasting established the "congruence" principle that the level of review
of state and federal racial preferences would be exactly the same-strict
scrutiny.103 That sentence is simply incorrect. No Supreme Court majority
had ever reached that result. Then Justice O'Connor said that "the Court
97. Id. at 564-65.
98. Id. at 565.
99. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
100. Id. at 235.
101. See Jeb Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141, 1141-
43, 1176 (2002).
102. See William Perry Pendley, Last Chance for a Color-Blind Constitution?,
TOWNHALL.COM, Sept. 1, 2006,
http://townhall.com/columnists/WilliamPerryPendley/2006/09/01/last chance for a color-
blindconstitution; John O'Sullivan, Preferred Members: Affirmative Action for All, Except
White Males, NATIONAL REVIEW, Sept. 3, 2001,
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi ml282/is 17_53/ai 7723713 1.
103. Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 223-24.
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took a surprising turn" in Metro Broadcasting, that Metro Broadcasting
"departed from prior cases" and finally that Metro Broadcasting was "a
significant departure from much of what had come before it."' 04 She then
expressly overruled Metro Broadcasting."'
There are many plausible arguments as to why Metro Broadcasting was
incorrectly decided, and there are many reasonable arguments as to why the
principles of stare decisis did not require it to be affirmed. However, there
are no legitimate arguments that one of the reasons for not applying stare
decisis to Metro Broadcasting was because it was a departure from previous
cases.' As one noted commentator has observed, Justice O'Connor's
treatment of the state of the law at the time of Metro Broadcasting was
simply "dishonest."1'0 This reasoning is no better than the Court saying that
it would not adhere to Metro Broadcasting because there were not five
Justices who agreed to its reasoning.08 Had the Court given that mistaken
fact as a reason supporting its decision, presumably there would have been
much outrage, even among those who supported the result. Saying that
Metro Broadcasting was a significant departure from prior decisions is just
as incorrect as saying that five Justices did not agree to its reasoning.
Justice O'Connor's incorrect statement of the past in Adarand is an
example of judicial irresponsibility. The idea that the Court is bound to
some degree to respect its prior cases is a fundamental aspect of its duty to
make sure that the Court treats similarly situated people similarly, absent
good reason for a change in the law. When the Court makes a mockery of
prior doctrine, as Justice O'Connor did in Adarand, it acts outside its
appropriate role and implicates core rule of law principles. Although we as
a society may always be divided on the question of affirmative action, and
104. Id. at 225-27 nn.104-06.
105. Id. at 227.
106. For a few of the many scholars who have made this observation or similar
observations, see, e.g., David Kairys, More Or Less Equal, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTs. L. REv.
675, 683 (2004) (discussing Adarand's odd and troubling use of stare decisis); Frank S. Ratvich,
Creating Chaos in the Name of Consistency: Affirmative Action and the Odd Legacy ofAdarand
Contractors, Inc. v. Pena, 101 DICK. L. REv. 281, 316-317 (1997) (criticizing the Court's
analysis of the history of the question of what level of review to apply to federal affirmative
action programs); Jay Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as Judicial
Minimalism, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 298, 345 (1998) (suggesting that the Court's treatment of
Metro Broadcasting in Adarand was "both inherently unsatisfactory and precedentially
dangerous," although the commentator approved of the result in Adarand).
107. Neil Devins, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena and the Continuing Irrelevance of
the Supreme Court's Affirmative Action Decision, 37 WM. & MARY L. REv. 673, 706 (1996).
108. That was one of the reasons given by Justice Rehnquist for not applying stare decisis
to an Eleventh Amendment question in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 63-64 (1996).
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what level of review should be applied to whom, we are not divided on the
question of whether the Court should have to wrestle with its precedents in
a meaningful and appropriate manner. The Court failed to do this in
Adarand, which makes Justice O'Connor's opinion a classic example of
irresponsible judging, though not for the reasons that most commentators
suggest-that the Court applied an improper legal standard to an act of
Congress or that it reversed its own recent precedent. Rather, the Court
failed to appropriately acknowledge or justify its abandonment of prior
doctrine with valid legal reasons.
Also during the 1990's, the Court issued a pair of decisions cutting back
on Congress' commerce clause powers to require states to implement
federal law. In New York v. United States,10 9 the Court held that Congress
does not have the authority to require state legislatures to carry out federal
policy. In Printz v. United States,"o the Court held that Congress could not
mandate that state executives help implement a federal gun control
program. The issue whether Congress could press state executives into
federal service, according to Justice Scalia, who wrote the majority opinion
in Printz, was not answered by the "constitutional text" and, therefore, had
to be resolved by looking at "historical understanding and practice . . . the
structure of the Constitution, and . . . the jurisprudence of this Court."111
Justice Scalia, having made historical understandings relevant to the
constitutional question, was then forced to wrestle with unambiguous
statements from the founders that Congress could, contrary to the Court's
ultimate holding, press state governments into federal service. As both
Justices Souter and Stevens argued in dissent, Alexander Hamilton in The
Federalist No. 27 made the following statement on this very question:
"[The Constitution] by extending the authority of the federal head to the
individual citizens of the several States, will enable the government to
employ the ordinary magistracy of each in the execution of its laws."l1 2
Justice Stevens went on to say that "Hamilton's meaning was unambiguous;
the Federal Government was to have the power to demand that local
officials implement national policy programs.""' Justice Stevens also
bolstered his historical argument by providing examples of early federal
109. 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992).
110. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
111. Id. at 905.
112. Id. at 945, 971 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)
(quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 27, at 174 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961)).
113. Id. at 945-46 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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laws requiring state judges to implement federal law, not by acting as
judges, but by performing various administrative tasks.l14
Justice Scalia, having stated that history was relevant, had to respond to
this evidence. As to Hamilton's statements, his response was the following:
There are several obstacles to such an interpretation [that The
Federalist No. 27 meant that the federal government could
conscript state executives]. First, the consequences in question . .
are said in the quoted passage to flow automatically from the
officers' oath to observe "the laws. . . ." Thus, if the passage
means that state officers must take an active role in the
implementation of federal law, it means that they must do so
without the necessity for a congressional directive . . .. But no one
has ever thought, and no one asserts in the present litigation, that
that is the law. The second problem with Justice Souter's reading
is that it makes state legislatures subject to federal direction ....
We have held, however, that state legislatures are not subject to
federal direction.115
Justice Scalia's reasons for rejecting the plain and unequivocal meaning
of The Federalist No. 27 are not just unpersuasive arguments; they do not
rise to the level of a meaningful response. The first reason Scalia provides is
difficult to comprehend. Apparently he is suggesting that, to the extent that
The Federalist No. 27 stands for the proposition that state agents would
have to implement federal law even when not asked, "no one has ever
thought" that to be the case.116 But the reason "no one ... ever thought" that
is because no one would ever interpret the language that way. Justice Scalia
is tearing down an imaginary straw man of his own creation. The dissent's
argument was that when the federal government acts pursuant to its
enumerated powers, it is allowed to "employ the ordinary magistracy of
each [state] in the execution of its laws"'1 7 if it wants to, not that state
officers have to carry out federal policy automatically. Scalia's first
response is not a response at all.
Justice Scalia's second response to The Federalist No. 27 is that, if it
says what Justices Stevens and Souter argue it means, then it would be
inconsistent with the Court's holding in New York v. United States,"' which
held that Congress could not commandeer state legislatures. New York was
114. Id. at 949-51.
115. Id at 912 (majority opinion) (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 945, 971 (Souter, J., dissenting) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting THE
FEDERALIST No. 27, at 174 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961)).
118. Id. at 912.
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decided in 1992 and did not discuss The Federalist No. 27 or any other
relevant history on this question. The point is that it was Justice Scalia who
put history into play in Printz, and there is no reasonable argument that
history supported his side, which is perhaps why Justice Stevens said in
dissent that "[n]o fair reading of these [historical] materials can justify ...
[the majority's] interpretation.""'
I am not arguing that Printz was decided incorrectly, though I think that
it was. But Justice Scalia's historical arguments go well beyond poor
reasoning. They amount to the giving of reasons that are, in fact,
illegitimate. It is past time that, when evaluating Justices, we stop ignoring
the presentation of arguments that reflect bad faith, dishonesty, or gross
carelessness. Most of the arguments in Printz are capable of reasonable
disagreement, but what history reflects on the important question of
congressional commandeering of state officers is simply not one of them.
Justice Black in Younger flatly mischaracterized the holding of the most
current case directly on point; Justice O'Connor in Adarand distorted
beyond recognition the history of a key affirmative action issue; and Justice
Scalia in Printz ignored unambiguous historical facts undermining the result
he wanted to reach. Each case represents a clear example of the Supreme
Court acting irresponsibly, not because of the results reached, but because
of the obvious failings of the explanations offered for those results.
Another example of the Court's failure to meet minimal standards of
judicial responsibility is Rogers v. Tennessee,12 0 a case directly implicating
rule of law principles. 121 The defendant in Rogers stabbed his victim with a
knife causing death to occur fifteen months later. He was convicted of
second-degree murder despite the common law rule then applicable in
Tennessee that a defendant could not be convicted of murder if the death he
caused occurred more than a year and a day after the crime. The state
supreme court held that this rule no longer made sense, that it should be
abolished and that its abolition should be applied retroactively to this
defendant.
The Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution prohibits legislatures from
punishing people for crimes that were not a crime at the time of the
defendant's conduct. 122 The text of the clause, however, applies to
legislatures, not courts. Nevertheless, in Bouie v. City of Columbia,12 3 the
119. Id. at 947 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
120. 532 U.S. 451 (2001).
121. For a similar discussion of this case, see Eric J. Segall, Justice O'Connor and the Rule
ofLaw, 17 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 107, 131-33 (2006).
122. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10 ("No state shall ... pass .. . [any] ex post facto law.").
123. 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
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Supreme Court held that ex post facto principles apply to courts through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because "[i]f a state
legislature is barred by the Ex Post Facto Clause from passing such a law, it
must follow that a state supreme court is barred by the Due Process Clause
from achieving precisely the same result by judicial construction."l24 The
issue in Rogers was whether the holding of Bouie prohibited the retroactive
repeal of the "year and a day" rule by the Tennessee Supreme Court.
Despite the clear ruling of Bouie, the Court in Rogers held that the Due
Process Clause did not specifically incorporate ex post facto limitations.
The Court said that Bouie was based on core due process concepts such as
fair notice and foreseeability and that the Court's discussion of the Ex Post
Facto Clause was dicta. 125 Extending the Ex Post Facto Clause to the courts,
according to the Court, would show too little regard for the differences
between legislatures and courts. 126
In light of this interpretation of Bouie, the question in Rogers was not
whether the Tennessee Supreme Court violated ex post facto limitations by
retroactively abolishing the year and a day rule but whether the defendant
had fair warning that the rule might be changed. The Court concluded that
he did because the rule had become an "outdated relic of the common law,"
the rule had been abolished in most other jurisdictions, and at the time of
the crime the rule had only "a tenuous foothold" in the criminal law of
Tennessee. 12 7 Therefore, even though the year and a day rule was still
technically part of the Tennessee criminal law at the time of the defendant's
offense, he could be convicted of murder despite the fact that his victim
died fifteen months after the crime.
The Court's characterization of the Bouie Court's discussion of the Ex
Post Facto Clause as dicta is simply wrong. That discussion was "essential
to the holding of that case," and it was repeated at the end of the opinion
before the holding was announced.128 As Justice Scalia said in his dissent,
the Rogers majority's determination that the Ex Post Facto discussion in
Bouie was dicta could be right only if the "concept of dictum ... includes
the very reasoning of the opinion."l29
The Court's mischaracterization of Bouie in Rogers violates rule of law
and judicial responsibility principles on several levels. The substantive issue
in these cases is whether a person can be convicted of a crime that was not
124. Id. at 353-54.
125. See Leading Cases, 115 HARV. L. REv. 306, 318 (2001).
126. Id. at 318-19.
127. Id. at 319 (citing Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 463-64 (2001).
128. Id. at 321-22.
129. Id. at 322. (citing Rogers, 532 U.S. at 469).
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an offense at the time of his action. The answer under the Ex Post Facto
Clause is no, and legislatures, therefore, cannot make criminal laws
retroactive. In Bouie, the Court held that it would be unfair for state courts
to accomplish what state legislatures could not. In Rogers, the Court not
only failed to faithfully apply rules of precedent, it then went on to hold that
courts may retroactively apply criminal laws as long as the defendant had
fair notice; a requirement the Court diluted beyond recognition in the
Rogers case. Ironically, the reason Justice O'Connor gave for this new rule
was that courts are more constrained than legislatures and, therefore,
retroactive judicial interpretations pose fewer dangers than retroactive
legislative changes. But, she said this is a case where the Court flatly
misinterpreted a prior case that would have given defendants fair notice that
courts are as much bound by the Ex Post Facto Clause as legislatures. Even
as to rule of law questions, the Court did not apply proper rule of law
principles and acted irresponsibly.
There is a plausible, non-legal explanation as to why the Court departed
from the Bouie rule in Rogers. The defendants in Bouie were civil rights
protesters who were asked to leave a whites-only counter during the early
1960's. Their convictions were upheld in the state courts even though South
Carolina's trespass laws had never before been interpreted to apply to the
situation of these protesters. 13 0 In Rogers, the defendant was far less
sympathetic as his crime simply involved "an isolated stabbing with no
socially redeeming purpose." 131 But the differences in these cases should
not make a constitutional difference because the defendant in Rogers was
just as entitled as the defendants in Bouie not to be held accountable for a
crime that was not a crime when he engaged in the conduct at question. The
Court in Rogers should have either overruled Bouie expressly or explained
why it was different. Instead, it simply mischaracterized the past in a
constitutionally meaningful way.
A final example of the kind of judicial failure that we should be
concerned about, though I could provide many more, involved a case in
which the Court decided not to resolve the merits of the controversy nor to
overturn a previous case. The issue in Allen v. Wright was whether parents
of black school children had standing to file a lawsuit challenging the way
the IRS was enforcing its legal obligations to deny tax exempt status to
private schools that discriminated on the basis of race. 13 2 The children's
parents argued that the government's subsidizing of these private schools
130. Idat 323.
131. Id.
132. 468 U.S. 737, 740 (1984). For a similar summary of the problems with this case, see
Segall, supra note 121, at 112-14.
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made it more difficult for their children to receive a desegregated public
school education. Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, held that the
alleged integration injury was sufficient to satisfy the injury prong of the
standing test but the plaintiffs could not show that the government caused
their injuries because it was purely speculative whether the withdrawal of
the tax exemptions would cause the allegedly discriminatory private schools
to modify their policies in a way that would drive white children back to the
public schools. 33 The problem was that there was a prior Supreme Court
case raising the identical issue where the plaintiffs were granted standing. In
1971, in Coit v. Green, parents of public school children also claimed that
the IRS policy of providing tax exemptions to racially discriminatory
private schools made it more difficult for their children to receive a
desegregated public school education.134 This was exactly the same
allegation made by the plaintiffs in Allen. The Court could have overruled
Coit but did not. Instead, it tried to distinguish the case partly on the basis
that Coit involved a summary affirmance, but that was a throw-away line
because standing is a matter of subject matter jurisdiction, and the Court
cannot summarily affirm any decision unless the plaintiffs have Article III
standing. Instead, the majority spent most of its time trying to distinguish
Coit on the facts, stating:
[T]he facts in the Coit case are sufficiently different from those
presented in this lawsuit that the absence of standing here is
unaffected by the possible propriety of standing there. In
particular, the suit in Coit was limited to the public schools of one
State. Moreover, the District Court found, based on extensive
evidence before it . . . that large numbers of segregated private
schools had been established in the State for the purpose of
avoiding a unitary public school system; that the tax exemptions
were critically important to the ability of such schools to succeed;
and that the connection between the grant of tax exemptions to
discriminatory schools and desegregation of the public schools in
the particular State was close enough to warrant the conclusion
that irreparable injury to the interest in desegregated education
was threatened if the tax exemptions continued.135
There are significant problems with this analysis. The Court suggested
that the plaintiffs could not sufficiently prove for standing purposes a
proposition that the granting of tax exemptions to racially discriminatory
133. Id. at 756-58.
134. 404 U.S. 997, 997 (1971), aff'd, Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1171 (D.C.
1971).
135. Allen, 468 U.S. at 764-65 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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private schools threatened integrated public schools, because, in a previous
case, other plaintiffs, after being given the opportunity at trial, proved
exactly that proposition. As the dissent in Allen pointed out, the majority's
discussion of Coit "stretches the imagination beyond its breaking point."' 36
We are left unable to discern the Court's real rationale, making it
impossible to predict how the next standing case will be decided and why
two sets of similarly situated plaintiffs were treated differently by the
Supreme Court.
It bears emphasizing that the problem with Allen is not just that the
reasoning is unpersuasive. What is wrong with Allen is that a prior
indistinguishable case was distinguished in a manner no different than
saying the prior case was different because the color of the plaintiffs eyes
was different in one case than the other. Had that been the basis of the
decision, there would have been a huge uproar and no question that the
Court acted outside its appropriate role. As Professor Geoffrey Stone has
written:
It is the responsibility of the judge faithfully to apply
precedent, to explain his or her reasoning in an honest and
forthright manner, to acknowledge the difficulties when they arise,
and to explain and to justify any departures from precedent. That
is at the very heart of the judicial craft, and it is the very essence of
a principled system of law. 3
The notion that Coit was distinguishable from Allen because, in Coit, the
plaintiffs proved at trial what the Allen plaintiffs alleged pretrial is fanciful
and amounts to a bad faith effort to deal with difficult precedent. Allen is a
classic example of irresponsible judicial behavior.
I could provide many other examples of the Court's disregard of facts
and cases inconsistent with the results it wanted to reach, its failures to
address an issue, which, by any kind of logic, should have been addressed
or its obvious mischaracterizations of prior cases. A notable professor
recently described five such examples all occurring in the last two years.138
This kind of judicial behavior should be given more attention by scholars
and politicians. As two academics have only recently observed:
The primary function of transparency in proceedings at trials
and arguments, and of published decisions and opinions
explicating judges' rulings, is to manifest their disinterest not only
136. Id. at 780 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
137. Geoffrey R. Stone, The Roberts Court, Stare Decisis, and the Future of Constitutional
Law, 82 TUL. L. REv. 1533, 1536 (2008).
138. See id at 1538-42.
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to the parties whose contentions they judge, but also to their
lawyers, who share responsibility for imposing moral judgment on
the professionalism of judges . . . . A judge or a Justice, sitting in a
court of law, who intentionally and often disregards controlling
legal texts . . . should be chastised.13 9
It is well past time that politicians, scholars, and lawyers wrestle with
this problem of judicial irresponsibility, and we can begin that process by
focusing on the jurisprudence of the most important judge in America-
Justice Anthony Kennedy.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE ANTHONY
KENNEDY
Justice Kennedy has written numerous opinions exemplifying both
extremes of judicial responsibility. Some of his opinions are refreshingly
transparent and honest, reflecting fidelity to the past, while others reflect
many of the problems with the Court's failure to adhere to minimal levels of
judicial behavior. This Section discusses both kinds of cases.
A glaring exercise of judicial irresponsibility by Justice Kennedy is his
decision in Romer v. Evans,140 though not for the reasons often given by
politicians and scholars. The issue in Romer was the constitutionality of
Amendment Two to the Colorado Constitution which provided the
following:
NO PROTECTED STATUS BASED ON HOMOSEXUAL,
LESBIAN OR BISEXUAL ORIENTATION. Neither the State of
Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of
its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school
districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation,
ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual
orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or
otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons
to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected
status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution
shall be in all respects self-executing. 14 1
Shortly after Amendment Two was passed, various plaintiffs filed suit in
a Denver state court claiming that Amendment Two, on its face, violated
139. Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Original Sin and Judicial Independence:
Providing Accountability for Justices, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1105, 1106, 1117 (2009).
140. 517 U.S. 620, 620 (1996).
141. Id. at 624 (citing COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30(b) (1992)) (emphasis added).
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several Constitutional provisions, including the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause. The plaintiffs included three cities that had
enacted anti-discrimination measures based on sexual orientation and
individuals who sought governmental policies and laws barring
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
The Colorado Supreme Court first held that Amendment Two was
subject to strict scrutiny because it burdened the fundamental rights of
homosexuals and bisexuals to participate equally in the political process.
The court remanded the case for a trial to determine whether Amendment
Two was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. 142
Upon remand, the lower court concluded that Amendment Two did not
serve a compelling state interest in the least restrictive manner. 143 The court
permanently enjoined enforcement of the statute. The Colorado Supreme
Court affirmed that decision and restated its previous holding that
Amendment Two infringed upon the fundamental right of an identifiable
group to participate equally in the political process.144
By a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
Colorado Supreme Court, though on different grounds.145 Justice Kennedy
began his analysis by quoting Justice Harlan's famous statement from his
dissenting opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson that the United States Constitution
"neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens."1 4 6 He then referred to
Amendment Two as an amendment that "prohibits all legislative, executive
or judicial action at any level of state or local government designed to
protect the named class, a class we shall refer to as homosexual persons ...
. He noted that various state, city, and local governments in Colorado
had adopted specific policies prohibiting discrimination against
homosexuals and that all of these provisions were repealed by Amendment
Two. Rejecting the State's argument that Amendment Two sim4ply "puts
gays and lesbians in the same position as all other persons," Justice
Kennedy found that Amendment Two placed homosexuals in a "solitary
class," and that it withdrew from them, "but no others, specific legal
protection from the injuries caused by discrimination. "l149
142. Id.
143. Id. at 626.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 635-36.
146. Id. at 623.
147. Id. at 624.
148. Id at 625.
149. Id at 627.
THE JUDICIAL ACTIVISM DEBATE
The Court also considered whether Amendment Two's reach was
broader than the prohibition of specific laws and policies granting
homosexuals special treatment under the law. Justice Kennedy said that it
was a "fair, if not necessary" reading of Amendment Two that it deprived
homosexuals of the protection of general laws that forbade "arbitrary
discrimination in governmental and private settings." 50 Colorado had
numerous laws prohibiting arbitrary discrimination by government officials
and some private businesses, like insurance companies. The issue was
whether Amendment Two prohibited homosexuals from seeking the benefit
of these laws, which did not specifically grant them any protection above
and beyond other citizens. Justice Kennedy noted that, although this
interpretation of Amendment Two was possible, the Colorado Supreme
Court did not resolve this issue and neither would the Court. 51 As we will
see, this statement about the Colorado Supreme Court was important and
patently false.
Justice Kennedy began his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
analysis by noting that "if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor
targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long
as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end." 52 Justice Kennedy,
however, never addressed the issues whether Amendment Two burdened a
fundamental right or whether homosexuals were a suspect class. Instead, he
held that Amendment Two was not rationally related to a legitimate
governmental interest.
Justice Kennedy stated that Amendment Two identified people "by a
single trait and then denie[d] them protection across the board." 153 This
attempt to disqualify a "class of persons from the right to seek specific
protection from the law [was] unprecedented in our jurisprudence." 154 He
observed that "[c]entral both to the idea of the rule of law and to our ...
guarantee of equal protection is the principle that the government . . .
remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance."15 5 A law
making it more "difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek
aid from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in
the most literal sense."I 5 6
150. Id. at 630.
151. Id. at 630.
152. Id. at 631.
153. Id at 633.
154. Id
155. Id.
156. Id
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Justice Kennedy stated that Colorado tried to justify Amendment Two on
the grounds that the Amendment showed respect for citizens' freedom of
association and religion and that it helped conserve resources to fight
discrimination against other groups. 15 7 He flatly rejected these arguments
stating that the "breadth of the Amendment is so far removed from these
particular justifications that we find it impossible to credit them.""' Instead,
he found that Amendment Two was passed because of "animosity toward
the class of persons affected," and that such a purpose was impermissible
under the Fourteenth Amendment.159 States are simply not allowed to "deem
a class of persons a stranger to its laws."160
Although many politicians and a few scholars have suggested that the
Romer Court's invalidation of Amendment Two amounted to far reaching
judicial activism, they generally have based their conclusion on the
argument that the Court erred in striking down the constitutional
amendment. 16 1 In turn, many other scholars and some politicians have
argued that the Court correctly invalidated a state's efforts to harm
homosexuals without any legitimate reason.162 There is no objectively
correct resolution of this question. The Romer opinion, however, is
irresponsible for two reasons, neither having to do with whether the case
was "correctly" decided. First, Justice Kennedy flatly mischaracterized the
opinion of the Colorado Supreme Court on an important issue in the case.
Justice Scalia, in his dissent and the State of Colorado, argued that
Amendment Two only deprived homosexuals of special protections under
the law, but that they would still be protected by laws of general
applicability. 163 This issue was important both because a law that denied
homosexuals all rights under Colorado law would be facially
unconstitutional and because there are statements in the majority opinion
157. Id. at 635.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 634.
160. Id at 635.
161. See, e.g., John Lofton, "Romer v. Evans" Case Roberts Helped Homosexuals With
Was So Bad Christian Legal Scholar Called For Impeachment Of Supreme Court Judges Who
Wrote Majority Opinion, THE AMERICAN VIEW, 2005,
http://www.theamericanview.com/index.php?id=367 (describing outrage in conservative
Christian political circles at Romer decision); Thomas L. Jipping, Anthony Kennedy Must Not be
Chief Justice, HUMAN EVENTS, July 1, 2002 (describing Romer as "one of the most activist
decisions of this century").
162. See, e.g., Scott Lemieux, Men Overboard: It's Not Just "Contrarian" For Center-Left
Pundits to Claim Roe Doesn't Matter. It's Stupid., AMERICAN PROSPECT, June 18, 2006,
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=men-overboard_06.
163. Romer, 517 U.S. at 637-38 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
742 [ Ariz. St. L.J.
THE JUDICIAL ACTIVISMDEBATE
which suggested that Amendment Two had precisely that effect.16 4 Justice
Kennedy also did say, however, that Amendment Two was ambiguous on
this point, and that the Colorado Supreme Court "did not decide whether the
amendment ha[d] this effect . . . ."16 This last statement is simply wrong,
and therefore, the Court's implication throughout the opinion that
Amendment Two deprived homosexuals of something more than special
protections is also incorrect. As Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent, on
the very question of whether Amendment Two applied to laws of general
applicability, the Colorado Supreme Court said the following:
[I]t is significant to note that Colorado law currently proscribes
discrimination against persons who are not suspect classes,
including discrimination based on age . .. marital or family status .
. . veterans' status ... and for any legal, off-duty conduct such as
smoking tobacco . . .. Of course Amendment 2 is not intended to
have any effect on this legislation, but seeks only to prevent the
adoption of antidiscrimination laws intended to protect gays,
lesbians, and bisexuals. 166
The Supreme Court is bound by the interpretation of state law by state
supreme courts. 167 The above paragraph is not ambiguous. Amendment
Two, as interpreted by the Colorado Supreme Court, prohibited the
enactment of anti-discrimination laws by local Colorado communities
favoring homosexuals "and nothing more."l68 Justice Kennedy's statement
that the Colorado Supreme Court did not resolve the question of
Amendment Two's effect on laws of general applicability was incorrect and
irresponsible.
A second and even worse aspect of the Romer decision involves an
important issue the Court did not discuss at all. At the time Romer was
decided, Bowers v. Hardwick,169 which had upheld a Georgia law
criminalizing sodomy as applied to homosexuals, was still good law. In
Bowers, the Supreme Court "held that the Constitution does not prohibit
what virtually all States had done from the founding of the Republic until
164. Id at 630 (explaining that Amendment Two may "deprive[] gays and lesbians even of
the protection of general laws and policies that prohibit arbitrary discrimination in
governmental and private settings.") (emphasis added).
165. Id.
166. Id at 637 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Evans v.
Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1346 n.9 (Colo. 1994)).
167. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975) ("This Court . . repeatedly has
held that state courts are the ultimate expositors of state law.").
168. Romer, 517 U.S. at 638 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
169. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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very recent years-making homosexual conduct a crime." 170 The parties in
Romer did not challenge Bowers, which made it easy for Justice Scalia to
argue in dissent that, if the state can put someone in jail for engaging in
certain conduct, then it most certainly may enact "other laws merely
disfavoring" that conduct.'7' "After all, there can hardly be more palpable
discrimination against a class than making the conduct that defines the class
criminal."l 72 Furthermore, Scalia argued that even if Amendment Two
applied to homosexuals who did not engage in homosexual conduct, "[i]f it
is rational to criminalize the conduct" then it must be "rational to deny
special favor and protection to those with a self-avowed tendency or desire
to engage in the conduct." 73 Justice Scalia concluded his dissent with a
lengthy discussion of why the Bowers decision allowed the people of
Colorado to consider homosexuality immoral and subject to the prohibitions
contained in Amendment Two.174
Leaving aside the question of whether Justice Scalia's dissent is
persuasive, the disturbing fact is that there is not one word in the majority
opinion about Bowers v. Hardwick. The case is simply never mentioned. In
light of the parties' reliance on the case as well as Justice Scalia's dissent,
there is no justification for Justice Kennedy's failure to mention it at all,
even in a footnote. Perhaps the Court knew it was going to overrule Bowers
eventually so the irreconcilability of Bowers and Romer did not trouble the
Court. But even if that is true, which we cannot know, the Court's duty was
to explain transparently its reasoning and its break with the past. Justice
Scalia forcefully argued that if Colorado could constitutionally put
homosexuals in prison for engaging in homosexual conduct, then it could
certainly deny them the benefit of special protection statutes based on that
same conduct. Perhaps there are responses to that argument, perhaps not,
but it is undeniable that Justice Kennedy should have at least wrestled with
or addressed the argument in some way. His failure to do so is judicial
abdication at its worst.175
170. Romer, 517 U.S. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 641 (emphasis omitted).
172. Id. (internal citation and quotation omitted).
173. Id. at 642.
174. See id. at 644.
175. It may be that Bowers and Romer are distinguishable because the former involved due
process and the latter equal protection, though that is doubtful because if Colorado could have
constitutionally put people in jail for engaging in homosexual conduct, why could it not simply
say people who engage in that conduct may not receive special protections on the basis of that
conduct. Romer, 517 U.S. at 641. After all, Congress has debated adding sexual orientation to
the list of protected statuses in Title VII but has never done so, and no one suggests that
Congress' decision amounts to an equal protection violation. But none of that is really the point.
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After Romer was decided, politicians on the right lambasted the result,
whereas those on the left applauded the Court's decision. 176 Most of the
legal academy, which is predominantly liberal, supported the invalidation of
Amendment Two though many strained to find alternative rationales for the
decision believing that it lacked a persuasive one.177 But while everyone
argued about how the case should have been decided, and whether or not
the result was unwarranted judicial activism or the application of correct
equal protection principles, virtually no one criticized the Court for its
failure to mention the case most directly on point-Bowers v. Hardwick.
This failure illustrates the futility of the current debate over judicial
activism. Reasonable people can disagree over whether the result in Romer
was plausible in light of the live nature of Bowers at the time, and
reasonable people can disagree over what the correct result should have
been in Romer, even assuming the inevitable reversal of Bowers. But
reasonable people must admit that the Court has an obligation to at least
mention the one case most directly relevant and relied upon by the
defendant to support its arguments and claimed by the dissent to be
dispositive. Justice Kennedy's failure to mention Bowers even once is
inconsistent with the Court's obligation to wrestle in good faith with the
past.
Another clear example of Justice Kennedy's judicial irresponsibility is
Roper v. Simmons. 178 In Roper, the Court had to decide whether the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments was violated by the
execution of juveniles.179 Just a few years earlier, the Court held in Stanford
v. Kentucky,' that it was not cruel and unusual punishment for states to
execute people under eighteen years of age. The Roper Court reversed
Stanford and held that the Eighth Amendment precludes states from
executing juveniles. Reasonable people can disagree over the correctness of
that decision, but, as demonstrated below, not over the persuasiveness of a
major part of Justice Kennedy's justifications for his conclusion.
The point is that, if there is a way to harmonize Romer and Bowers, the Court should have done
so, or at least tried to do so. If not, the Court should have overturned Bowers. What the Court
should not have done is ignored it altogether.
176. See Lofton, supra note 161; Jipping, supra note 161; Lemieux, supra note 162.
177. See Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONsT. COMMENT. 257
(1996); Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95 MICH. L. REv.
203 (1996).
178. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
179. Id at 578.
180. 492 U.S. 361, 368 (1989).
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A key issue in Roper was whether there was a national consensus that
capital punishment for people under eighteen violates modem standards of
decency.' At the time that Stanford was decided, twenty-two of the thirty-
seven death penalty States permitted the death penalty for 16-year-old
offenders, and among these thirty-seven States, twenty-five permitted it for
17-year-old offenders.182 Accordingly, over half of those states that allowed
the death penalty did not exempt people sixteen and seventeen years old.
The Stanford Court did not consider relevant those states that had altogether
abolished the death penalty in the determination of whether there was a
national consensus against executing juveniles.'83 In Roper, however,
Justice Kennedy found a national consensus against executing juveniles
mainly because, taking into consideration those states which had abolished
the death penalty for everyone, he concluded that thirty out of fifty states
prohibited the juvenile death penalty.'84 There are numerous intractable
problems with this argument. The issue under consideration was whether
there was a national consensus against executing juveniles, and no possible
logical leap could justify counting in that calculation states that do not have
the death penalty. Justice Kennedy's reasoning would apply equally to the
question of whether there was a national consensus against executing
people over eighty or executing blondes. In answering those questions, we
certainly would not consult states that did not have the death penalty at all,
as the Court did in Stanford.' Justice Kennedy did not purport to explain
why the Court was taking a different path in Roper, showing little respect
for either the past or the true facts of the case.
If we look at only those states with the death penalty at the time of
Roper, 47% of them disallowed it for people under eighteen. As Justice
Scalia quipped in dissent, "words have no meaning if the views of less than
50% of death penalty States can constitute a national consensus."l 86
Moreover, even if we count those states that had prohibited the death
penalty for everyone, only approximately three-fifths of the states could be
said to have prohibited the death penalty for juveniles. The Court's prior
death penalty jurisprudence, however, required a far greater statistical
181. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 564.
182. Id. at 562.
18 3. Id.
184. Id. at 564.
185. See Posner, supra note 6, at 90 (Kennedy's reasoning was "the equivalent of saying
that [non-capital punishment] states had decided that octogenarians deserve a special immunity
from capital punishment.").
186. Roper, 543 U.S. at 609 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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showing than that to demonstrate a national consensus.1 17 Justice Kennedy
made no attempt to explain away the Court's older capital punishment
cases, again showing great disrespect for the past. As Justice Scalia
remarked in dissent, Justice Kennedy's reasoning made a "mockery" of the
idea that the Court would be constrained by precedent.' As Judge Posner
has said, if Roper is stripped of "its fig leaves," the decision constitutes "a
naked political judgment."'89
The problem with decisions like Romer, Roper, and all of the opinions
discussed in Part II is that they demonstrate that the Supreme Court quite
often fails to act like a Court and instead behaves like some other kind of
political institution. One significant difference between judges and other
political officials is that at common law, and today, judges are supposed to
explain their decisions with transparency and justify their results by
reference to what has come before. If the Court departs from past law, it
should explain that decision. A legislature can change its mind on an
important question for no reason other than the people elected think that it is
a good idea to do things differently. But, for the judicial system to have
integrity, the Justices must act with "intellectual candor.""
It is disingenuous . . . to distinguish a prior decision on the
ground that it was handed down on a Tuesday rather than on a
Wednesday, or on the ground that the car was blue rather than
green. Moreover, because the act of overruling a prior decision is
and should be relatively unusual in our legal system, such an act
when it occurs should be openly acknowledged, explained, and
justified. 191
The American public, the media, constitutional law scholars, and the
political branches have never seriously debated whether the Supreme Court
acts with enough integrity to meet shared public ideals of how courts should
operate. But there are so many Supreme Court decisions like Romer, Roper,
and all the cases discussed in Part II that fail to wrestle in good faith with
187. See Stephen F. Smith, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Death, 94 VA. L. REv.
283, 343 n. 211 (2008) ("even if abolitionist states are counted, however, there would still not
be the high level of consensus among the states that was typically required before a punishment
could be invalidated as contrary to evolving standards of decency."). See also Roper, 543 U.S.
at 613-19 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (listing cases where the Court required much stronger showing
of national consensus than Kennedy relied upon in Roper).
188. Roper, 543 U.S. at 608.
189. See Posner, supra note 6, at 90.
190. Stone, supra note 137, at 1534.
191. Id.
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the past, that these questions should now be asked by those who follow the
Court.
Justice Kennedy himself has demonstrated that Supreme Court opinions
can operate within the structure of good faith engagement with the past
even if the result reached is disfavored by many people. Unlike Romer and
Roper, for example, Justice Kennedy's concurring opinions in U.S. Term
Limits Inc., v. Thornton9 2 and Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District No. 1193 exemplify well-written, transparent
examples of excellent judicial opinion-writing regardless of whether one
agrees or disagrees with the results of those cases.
The issue in Term Limits was whether Arkansas could limit ballot access
to any candidate running for the United State House of Representatives who
had already served three terms and to any candidate for the Senate who had
served two terms (although they could be a write-in candidate). The Court
divided five-to-four on the issue with Justice Kennedy aligning himself with
the four moderates and against the four conservatives, and voting against
state term limits for Congressmen. Justice Stevens' majority opinion spent
over twenty pages discussing the history of state term limits, while the
dissenting opinion of Justice Thomas needed over thirty pages to rebut that
history. 9 4 Not surprisingly, the two sides reached exactly opposite
conclusions based on the same evidence. Additionally, both the majority
and dissenting opinions spent considerable time discussing relevant
precedent and agreeing on the most important cases, but disagreeing on
whether those cases supported or invalidated state term limits.'95 Both sides
also argued over the text and structure of the Constitution, again reaching
opposite conclusions based on the same words.'96 Anyone brave enough to
carefully slog through the over 140 pages of majority and dissenting
arguments about text, history, structure, and precedent most likely would
come away with the idea that those traditional sources of constitutional
interpretation not only did not answer this difficult but important question,
but also find it difficult to truly understand the actual basis of each sides'
fundamental conclusions. In other words, neither the majority nor the
dissent wrote a transparent judicial opinion.
192. 514 U.S. 779, 837 (1995) (invalidating term limits for member of Congress).
193. 551 U.S. 701, 798 (2007) (invalidating use of race in placing students in elementary
and secondary schools).
194. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 806-27; Id. at 846-74 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
195. See id at 795-98, 802-03, 854-55, 875 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
196. See id. at 798-802, 846-50 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion, however, was only seven and a
half pages long. 19 7 He began his opinion by stating:
The majority and dissenting opinions demonstrate the intricacy
of the question [of term limits]. In my view, however, it is well
settled that the whole people of the United States asserted their
political identity and unity of purpose when they created the
federal system. The dissent's course of reasoning suggesting
otherwise might be construed to disparage the republican character
of the National Government, and it seems appropriate to add these
few remarks to explain why that course of argumentation runs
counter to fundamental principles of federalism.198
Over the next seven pages, Justice Kennedy argued why these
"fundamental principles" counseled against the validity of state term limits
for members of Congress. Although he cited some history and precedent
along the way, the reader comes away from Justice Kennedy with the sense
that it is his opinion about those "fundamental principles of federalism" that
drives his interpretation of history, text, and precedent, and not the other
way around. In light of the hopelessly ambiguous nature of those traditional
sources of constitutional interpretation, Justice Kennedy exercised excellent
judicial responsibility by transparently expressing the real basis for his
decision. He began by explaining the importance of federalism as follows:
Federalism was our Nation's own discovery. The Framers split
the atom of sovereignty. It was the genius of their idea that our
citizens would have two political capacities, one state and one
federal, each protected from incursion by the other. The resulting
Constitution created a legal system unprecedented in form and
design, establishing two orders of government, each with its own
direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual rights and
obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it. It
is appropriate to recall these origins, which instruct us as to the
nature of the two different governments created and confirmed by
the Constitution. 199
He then argued that allowing states to interfere with federal elections for
members of Congress would deny "the dual character of the Federal
Government," and that the people of the United States "have a political
identity . . . one independent of, though consistent with, their identity as
197. See id. at 838-45 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
198. Id. at 838.
199. Id. at 838-39.
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citizens of the State of their residence."20 0 He argued that the "federal
character of congressional elections flows from the political reality that our
National Government is republican in form and that national citizenship has
privileges and immunities protected from state abridgment by the force of
the Constitution itself"20 ' After providing a few examples from history and
case law of the importance of national citizenship, Justice Kennedy
explained that the proposition that "federal rights flow to the people of the
United States by virtue of national citizenship is beyond dispute." 20 2 He
concluded his opinion that state term limits violate this federal right as
follows:
It is maintained by our dissenting colleagues that the State of
Arkansas seeks nothing more than to grant its people surer control
over the National Government, a control, it is said, that will be
enhanced by the law at issue here. The arguments for term
limitations (or ballot restrictions having the same effect) are not
lacking in force; but the issue, as all of us must acknowledge, is
not the efficacy of those measures but whether they have a
legitimate source, given their origin in the enactments of a single
State. There can be no doubt, if we are to respect the republican
origins of the Nation and preserve its federal character, that there
exists a federal right of citizenship, a relationship between the
people of the Nation and their National Government, with which
the States may not interfere. Because the Arkansas enactment
intrudes upon this federal domain, it exceeds the boundaries of the
Constitution.203
Justice Kennedy made it clear in his concurring opinion that he believes
that federalism requires two strong and independent governments, each of
which must have a separate political identity. State term limits on members
of Congress, he argued, interfered with those fundamental federalism
principles. These propositions are not self-evident and may not even follow
from each other, but they did transparently form the basis of Justice
Kennedy's opinion and are not obscured by dubious interpretations of text
and history. From a judicial responsibility standpoint, leaving aside the
correctness of his conclusions, which cannot be proven right or wrong,
Justice Kennedy could not have done any better.
200. Id. at 840.
201. Id. at 842.
202. Id. at 844.
203. Id. at 844-45.
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The issue in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1,204 was whether local school boards could use racial balancing
to cure the segregation of elementary and secondary schools caused by
residential housing patterns and other factors not directly attributable to
state action. In an overly simplistic and misleading plurality opinion, Chief
Justice Roberts, writing on behalf of Justices Scalia, Alito, and Thomas,
invalidated the desegregation plans, arguing that the racial balancing used
by the school boards was foreclosed by prior Court decisions applying strict
scrutiny to governmental classifications based on race.2 05 Justice Roberts
found that neither district had articulated a compelling state interest,
because the goal of both programs was simple racial diversity, not broader
educational diversity.20 6 The plurality argued that this use of race by the
school districts was inconsistent with Brown, and that "the way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of
race." 207
The result reached by the plurality opinion may be right or it may be
wrong, but the opinion's overall theme, that there is no difference between
the majority using racial classifications to keep whites and African-
Americans apart and the majority using racial classifications to bring the
races together, simply does not withstand serious scrutiny. As Justice
Kennedy said in his swing-vote concurring opinion:
The plurality's postulate that "[t]he way to stop discrimination
on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race," .
. . is not sufficient to decide these cases. Fifty years of experience
since Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), should
teach us that the problem before us defies so easy a solution.
School districts can seek to reach Brown's objective of equal
educational opportunity. The plurality opinion is at least open to
the interpretation that the Constitution requires school districts to
ignore the problem of de facto resegregation in schooling. I cannot
endorse that conclusion. To the extent the plurality opinion
suggests the Constitution mandates that state and local school
authorities must accept the status quo of racial isolation in schools,
it is, in my view, profoundly mistaken.208
Justice Kennedy also made the following statement about the goal of
having a color-blind society:
204. 551 U.S. 701, 710-11 (2007).
205. See id. at 722-24.
206. See id.
207. Id. at 748.
208. Id. at 788 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (parallel citation omitted).
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The statement by Justice Harlan that "[o]ur Constitution is
color-blind" was most certainly justified in the context of his
dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896). The
Court's decision in that case was a grievous error it took far too
long to overrule. Plessy, of course, concerned official
classification by race applicable to all persons who sought to use
railway carriages. And, as an aspiration, Justice Harlan's axiom
must command our assent. In the real world, it is regrettable to
say, it cannot be a universal constitutional principle.209
Justice Kennedy went on to make a nuanced argument that school
districts should be free to use racial solutions to remedy the difficult
problem of racially imbalanced public schools, but he agreed with the
majority that classifying students based on race alone without taking into
account any other factors was problematic. He concluded the following:
When the government classifies an individual by race, it must
first define what it means to be of a race. Who exactly is white and
who is nonwhite? To be forced to live under a state-mandated
racial label is inconsistent with the dignity of individuals in our
society. And it is a label that an individual is powerless to change.
Governmental classifications that command people to march in
different directions based on racial typologies can cause a new
divisiveness. The practice can lead to corrosive discourse, where
race serves not as an element of our diverse heritage but instead as
a bargaining chip in the political process. On the other hand race-
conscious measures that do not rely on differential treatment based
on individual classifications present these problems to a lesser
degree.21 0
Unlike both the plurality and dissenting opinions, Justice Kennedy did
not pretend that prior cases and general principles could solve the complex
issues relating to school segregation. Instead, he transparently set forth his
concerns about the individual characteristics of the specific plans at issue in
these cases and suggested that local school boards should at least try to
employ more nuanced measures to achieve desegregation than overt racial
balancing and quotas. As Professor Neil Siegel has argued, although Justice
Kennedy's concurring opinion in Parents Involved is not perfect and leaves
some important questions unanswered, it is a good example of what
Professor Siegel calls good "judicial statesmanship." 2 1  Although his
ultimate conclusions might be debatable, he wrestled honestly with the facts
209. Id. (parallel citation omitted).
210. Id. at 797.
211. Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue ofJudicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REv. 959 (2008).
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and the relevant precedents and based his holding on transparent reasons
that can be analyzed and discussed. In light of our country's significant
divide over how to best resolve the issue of racial segregation in our public
schools, we can neither ask nor expect much more from a Supreme Court
Justice.
CONCLUSION
Most of the constitutional questions decided by the Supreme Court of the
United States do not have right or wrong answers based on the traditional
sources of constitutional interpretation. When the Court is criticized by the
popular media, politicians, or even legal academics for engaging in judicial
activism, little is accomplished other than the voicing of disagreement over
the results the Court has reached. Moreover, in our fixation over whether
the Court "got it right," we have lost sight of a more important goal. The
Supreme Court has an obligation to act as a court, not just another political
institution making political decisions. By that, I mean it should wrestle
honestly and transparently with the past, even if that past cannot generate an
objectively right answer. Far too often, the Court has failed in this task, and
it is time to hold it accountable. Those who study and comment on the
Court should be paying more attention to the reasons the Court gives for its
decisions and focus less on the results the Court reaches. Only then can we
extricate ourselves from the empty name calling associated with the judicial
activism debate and move on to an important evaluation of how well the
Supreme Court is performing its judicial responsibility.
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